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RECENT BAR EXAMINATIONS.
We give below some interesting data
concerning examinations for admission to
the Ohio bar, held under the new rules of
the Supreme Court. Ohio has recently
adopted a central or state board for examining applicants for membership to the
different county bars.
Prior to the adoption of new rules, and
when special examinations were held at
the various law schools, the charge wis
frequently made that favoritism wasshown
the students from the schools, as largeproportions of the law office men taking the
examination at Columbus failed, while
only a small proportion of the law school
men failed. It therefore is especially interesting to compare the law school men
with the law office men in these two examinations.
In June, 1899, eighty-four per cent. of
all the failures were from law offices. Fiftyeight per cent. of the law office men failed,
while only seven per cent. of the law school
men failed.
In June, 1900, seventy-one per cent. of
all the failures were from the law offices.
Seventy per cent. of the law office men
failed and fifteen per cent. of the law school

men failed. Of the law school men that
failed, two-thirds came from the night
schools and foreign schools, so that from
the three leading schools of the state, only
five per cent. failed. In the former of these
examinations, forty-three per cent. of the
law school men stood above eighty, while
only six per cent. of the law office men
stood above that grade. In the latter of
these examinations, fifty-one per cent. of
the law school men stood above eighty,
and fourteen per cent. of the law office men
stood above that grade. It would therefore seem that the law schools have abundantly proven the groundlessness of the
charge formerly made against them.
The foregoing data fully establish this
proposition that men who have enjoyed
the advantage of systematic law school
training are much better fitted for the
Ohio bar examination than men who have
received their training in law offices.
The above, which is taken from the
Western Reserve University News-Letter
in relation to bar examinations in Ohio,
will not be without interest to lawyers and
students in this and other states. The statisties are very pronounced in favor of
study in law schools as against study in
offices, that is, in favor of instructors who
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are making the teaching of law their business and giving their best thought, effort.
and time, as against study under a practicing attorney who is making teaching only
a side issue and cannot possibly afford,
with only one or two students, to give the
matter the time and thought necessary to
keep himself posted as to the best books
for students and the best methods of applying them. If he has the brains that
would qualify him for a teacher, they will
bring him too much business to leave any
time for good teaching, and if he has the
time the probability is that he hasn't the
brains.
About three-fourths of the states in the
Union have adopted a State Board to examine applicants for admission to the several bars of the state. This mode of examining has been agitated for several years in
this state and has now begun to take some
definite form.
The State Bar Association has appointed
V. U. Hensel, of Lancaster; Diekson, of
Philadelphia; Harris, of Scranton, and
several other prominent members of the
several county bars to draft a "Memorial"
to be presented to the Supreme Court of
Pa., asking the Court to appoint a State
Board to examine apllicants for admission
to that Court. This is a good move in the
right direction as it will insure an equality
which has heretofore been impossible.
ALUMNI NOTES.
William E. Elmes. '02, has been appointed assistant business manager on The
Forum board, to fill the place vacated by
Chas. H. Drumheller.
Chas. H. Drumheller, '02, has been
obliged to discontinue his studies at the
Law School on account of ill health.
Guy Carleton Lee, a Dickinson graduate,
has charge of 1he literature or book review
department of the Baltimore Sun, a new
departure for newspaper work.
Robert P. Stewart,'00, was recently admitted to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. He has again returned to Deadwood, S. Dakota, where he has established
quite a large and lucrative practice.

Miss Sara Marvel, '00, past a very credit-able examination before the Philadelphia
Bar committee. The examination was a
very hard one and was of three days' duration. We wish to congratulate Miss Marvel
on her excellent success.
John R. Hemminger, '96, of the firm of
Marshall & Hemminger, reports having a
lucrative practice and also of being very
successful in his court work.
Lewellyn Hildreth, '99, was admitted to
the New Jersey bar November last and reports having been favored with a large
degree of success.
A. F. John, '00, Wencel Hartman, Jr.,
'00, and John B. Lavensspentseveral days
in town about March 10th.
Chas. Shalters, '98, reports havinga very
large practice at Reading.
Thomas K. Leidy,97, is doing very well
at the Reading bar and is building surely
for extended success in the future.
Oliver Lentz, '00, may be found at 522
Washington St., Reading. Although he
has but recently opened an office, he is
meeting with a fair degree of success.
Chas. G. Moyer, '99, is at present principal of the Stouchsburg Schools, but after
April 1st will share offices with Oliver
Lentz, '00, Reading, Pa.
THE ALLISON SOCIETY.
The work of this society has shown
marked improvement since the last issue
of the FORum. The attendance has been
large and is still on the increase and the
members all show a deep interest in the
welfare and work of the organization. The
programmes have been interesting and
lively and the debates have awakened at
times a hot discussion on the floor. The
society has every reason to feel encouraged
by its success under Pres. Barr's administration.
The debate on the Ship Subsidy Bill
aroused an intensely interesting discussion
by the membership in general after the reg-
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ular debates had closed, Messrs. Core and
Phillips leading on the different sides in
the general debate. The famous or infamous "Ripper" was also under discussion
and debated ably by Ed. Delaney and
Welsh in theaffirmative and Brennan and
Donahoe for the negative.
Among other interesting features were
papers by John McGuffie on "Physical
Culture" and Phillips on "The English
Language."
On Friday, March 15th, the society held
an open meeting and listened to one of the
most interesting and instructive lectures
ever given before it. The speaker was
Prof. S. B. Sadler and the subject was,
"The History and Development of Criminal Punishments." The lecturer traced
the rising of the idea of punishment for
crimes from the old custom of private revenge to state regulation of punishment.
He described vividly the various methods
and modes employed in all ages of English
and American jurisprudence and read
many quaint and curious writs, summons
and sentences. There was a large audience,
and the many signs of interest given
showed how thoroughly the lecture was
enjoyed by all.
THE DICKINSON SOCIETY.
On February 22, 1901, the society held
its regular election of officers. William T.
Osborne was elected president; V. S. Detrich, vice president; 4E. B. Williamson,
treasurer; F. B. Gerber, secretary, and
Char!es S. Davis, sergeant-at-arms.
During the past month the meetings
have been of the same general character as
heretofore. Orations were delivered by H,
M. Hamblin andA. Sherbine. Apaperon
"Washington" was read by W. L. Schanz.
A discussion of the proposed increase in
the salaries of the cabinet officers was
given by R. H. Lambert. Mr. Mowry
gave a select reading.
Two debates have been held. The arguments on the resolution, that the judges
of the Supreme, Superior and County
Courts of this Commonwealth should be
appointed by the Governor for life, proved
instructive and valuable. The relative
merits of the monarchial and republican
governments were reviewed in another
debate.

A new feature of the programs made its
first appearance on Friday evening, March
8th. "The Dickinson Society Weekly,"
published by a new corps of editors each
issue, will be a periodical of great interest
to members of the society. The indicatioris
are that it will be a great entertainer.
The first number was a delightful surprise
to those who heard it read. Volume one,
number one was edited by William T.
Stauffer, assisted by Joseph L. Rhodes and
H. A. Gross.

John H. Williams, Esq., Assistant District Attorney of Logan county, was born
in Wilkesbarre, Pa., April 14, 1876, removing with his parents in 1884 to Plymouth,
where he has resided ever since. After
completing his academic education in 1894,
he passed the preliminary examinations to
register as a student of the law. In the
same year he entered the office of Judge
Halsey, under whose tutorship he studied
for one year. Matriculating at Dickinson
School of Law, October, 1895, he was graduated with the degree of LL. B., June 8,
1897, and was admitted to the Cumberland
county bar June 9th, and to the Luzerne
county bar June 26 of the same year. He
immediately began the practice of his profession in his native city, was elected city
solicitor soon thereafter, which office he
continues to hold.
Mr. Williams is a young man of exceptional ability, as is evidenced by the unusual success he has met with as a practitioner, having been engaged as counsel in
many important civil and criminal cases
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in the lower and appellant courts of the
state, most of which he prosecuted to a
successful conclusion.
He does not wholly give himself up to
the pursuit of his vocation, but like most
men of vigorous mental powers, at times he
turns from the stern and exacting cares of
a busy lawyer seeking recreation in affairs
of a public nature, and manifests a cordial
interest in the welfare and development of
the community.
During the campaign of 1896, while yet a
student, he began his career as a political
speaker, addressing many large and enthusiastic meetings in various portions of the
state. After his graduation he kept up his
political interests and in the recent presidential campaign was one of the popular
orators of the Republican party in Pennsylvania, and the acknowledged party leader
of the third legislative district, the largest
and most populous of Luzerne county.
He had personal charge of the campaign
of Benj. R. Jones, Esq., the successful candidate for District Attorney, who appointed him his assistant as a reward for the
efficient manner in which he conducted
Mr. Jones' fight.
Mr. Williams' success is the logical result
of the correct methods intelligently applied
in a close study of the requirements of the
legal profession.
In addition he has the acumen which
sees and the energy to grasp opportunities
as well as the ability in dealing with men
that gives him an easy hold on their confidence and esteem. His manner is earnest,
impressive and deliberate, but at the same
time more intent on his matter than manner. If precedent is to be followed Mr.
Williams will be the next Republican
nominee for District Attorney of the third
largest county in Pennsylvania.
BOOK REVIEWS.
"Conflict of Laws or Private International Law," by Raleigh C. Minor, M. A.,
B. L., Professor of Law at the University
of Virginia. Sheep. Pp. 575. Price $3.50.
Boston: Little, Brown & Co.
The need of a book treating the subject
of the Conflict of Laws in the light of the
later decisions is manifest. The arrangement, as well as the theory, of this book

departs materially from that of its predecessors, the offspring of the great intellects
and profound learning of Story, Dicey and
Wharton. But the departure has been an
admirable one and the author is to be commended on the excellent arrangement and
theory of this important branch of the law.
The branch of the law discussed in this
book, though of daily growing importance,
is at present in a most chaotic condition.
But from the tangled skein of decisions,
the author has successfully reduced every
proposition to its ultimate principles, for
only by this means can order be brought
out of the confusion that now exists.
Every question involving the construction and application of a contract, the distribution of property under a will, or from
an intestate estate, the control of a married woman over her property, etc., in a
foreign jurisdiction, state or national, may
be a question of the Conflict of Laws.
These questions are becoming daily more
frequent in practice, and Mr. Minor discusses them carefully and in the light of
the latest decisions and the fullest research.
The latest and best theory is that the
foundation of the science of the Conflict of
Laws is Situs. Find the Situs, the "location, position, place, as it refers tojurisdiction" of the act or circumstances under
inquiry, and the law which governs can
be found. With this conclusion as to theory confirmed by careful study and deliberation, constantly in view, Mr. Minor
discusses his subject logically, and in the
light of the decided cases which are drawn
with impartial freedom from those of the
United States and State Courts, as well
as from the English Courts.
"Law of Landlord and Tenant in Pennsylvania," 2nd Edition, by Richard J.
Williams, Esq. T. & J. W. Johnson and
Co., Philadelphia. Pp. xxiii-310.
This book aims to bring within the
reach of the practitioner and those who
have to do with leasing real property a full
understanding of this branch of the law as
it exists at the present time in Pennsylvania.
In the multiplicity of law books and discussions, it is a great saving of time, both
for judges and lawyers, to have a treatise
which deals with the law as it is, and not

THE

FORUM.

as it was. This book supplies the want.
The treatment of the subject is orderly and
concise, and the citation of authorities is
complete; its arrangement is good, its
statement of principles clear and, so far as
we have ascertained, accurate.
"Dill's Constable Guide," by Win. F.
Dill, Esq. T. & J. W. Johnson & Co.,
Phila., Pa. Pp. xiv-230.
This little volume was written with the
intention of giving to constables, justices
as well as the legal profession of Pennsylvania a hand book of the laws governing
constables that is up to date not only as to
the statutes relating thereto, but with citations to all the imlortant decisions.
This work, while not of extensive proportions, yet it is an exhaustive treatise on
this branch of Pennsylvania law. It also
contains a complete collection of fornis
used and a list of fees chargeable by constables. It would be difficult to over-state
the value of this modest-sized volume.
The following is a continuation of the
schedule of counsel in fhe Moot Court
cases issued in last month's FoRum.
Plaintiff.

Defendant.

Case No. 97. Mitchell,
Taylor,
Deal,
Graul.
Basehore, J.
Alexander,
98. Kern,
Johnston,
Henderson.
Marx, J.
Conrey,
99. Sterrett,
Turner,
Trude.
Nicholls, J.
100. Keelor,
Schnee,
Delaney, E. A. Stauffer.
Barr, J.
101. Bouton,
Lord,
Delaney, Leroy Cisney.
Rhodes, J.
102. Helriegel,
Hoagland,
Kaufman,
Lambert.
Moon, J.
103. Hardesty,
Ebbert,
Peightel,
Cannon.
Adamson, J.
104. Lauer,
Mowry,
Schanz,
McGuffie.
Davis, J.
105. Brennan,
Miller,
Phillips,
Sherbine.
MacConnell, J.
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106. Rogers,
Yeagley,
Vastine,
Cooper.
Lonergan, J.
107. Walsh,
Mundy,
Wright,
Hickernell.
Points, J.
108. Thorne,
Brock,
Barr,
Boryer.
Alexander, J.
g 4109.

Kostenbauder, Brooks,

Moon,

"

Osborne.
Lightner, J.
110. Schnee,
Williamson.
Donahoe,
Fox.
Piper, J.
111. Rhodes, F.
Nicholls,
Minnich,
MacConnell
Frank, J.
112. Points,
Lonergan,
Adamson,
Turner.
Henderson, J.
113. Elmes,
Edwards,
McIntyre,
Detrich.
Graul, J.
" 114. Watson,
Kline, C.
Delaney,Leroy,Longbnttom
Elmes, J.
115. Basehore,
Gery,
Harpel,
Kennedy.
Kline, D., J.
116. Piper,
Clark,
Holcomb,
Marx,
Mitchell, J.
117. Rhodes, J.,
Trude,
Sterrett,
Davis.
Katz, J.
118. Conrey,
Brock,
Welsh,
Gerber.
Rhodes, F. J.
119. Lightner,
Kline, D.,
Hess,
Alexander.
Holcomb, J.
120. Claycomb,
Gross,
Core,
Mays.
Boryer, J.
121. Delaney, E. A. Schanz,
Lord,
Crary.
McIntyre, J.
122. Jones,
Keelor,
Kaufman,
Dever,
Minnich, 3.
123. Bouton,
Mowry,
Bishop,
Stauffer, C.
S1.
Osborne, .
124. Deal,
Frank,
Marx,
Graul.
Kennedy, J.
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MOOT COURT.
THOMPSON vs. McSHERRY,

ET Al.,

(onspiracy-Injuringtrade of another.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Thomas McSherry and other defendants
were grocers in the borough of Carlisle.
The grocers founded an association and
passed sundry reso!utions concerning their
business. One was to close their business
or stores at 6 P. M. except i-aturdays.
Another was to charge 5 cents extra for
every delivery made elsewhere than at the
stores. A third one was to give no credits.
Thompson at first entered into the association and supported th6 resolutions. After
observing them for six weeks he began to
violate them and in answer to expostulations declared that he would no longer
be bound by them. McSherry and the
defendants, who were all the grocers in
Carlisle except the plaintiff, then resolved
that they would deal with no wholesale
merchant that sold to Thompson and notifled all the wholesale dealers from whom
Thompson got his supplies of their purpose.
The result was that the dealers refused
to sell to Thompson and he was in a few
weeks compelled to quit the business. He
shows that he had been making 800 dollars
annually profit for five years before the
combination against him and he brings
this action to recover damages.
BROK and Ro eRs for plaintiff.
Individuals cannot conspire to injure
another person in his business. Wildie v.
McKee, Ill Pa. 335; Lavarty v. Varnarsda!e, 65 Pa. 507.
CONRY and WELSH for defendant.
The association was lawful. Brown v.
Matthewson, 14 Allen 499; McClurg's Appeal. 58 Pa. 51.
There is no evidence of malice. Hatch
v. Bagley; 12 Cush. 27.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

This action, brought by the plaintiff,
John Thompson, is to recover damages
from the defendants for unlawfully conspiring together, ruining his business and
thus doing him great hnancial injury.
There are two consolidations of -merchants noted in the facts of this case, First,
A lot of Carlisle merchants, including both

the plaintiff and the defendants, who
agreed to close their stores at a certain
time, to charge 5 cents extra for every delivery made elsewhere than at their stores
and to give no credits.
The second was of the merchants before
mentioned, except the plaintiff, who had
violated his agreement, and had withdrawn from the association, and of whose
action this complaint is made and upon
which this claim for damages is based.
This court has already decided, in the
case of John Henderson v. Abram Hayward, 5th Forum 31, that a combination,
such as the former of these two is, is. not
unreasonable and thatan injunction could
have been secured to prevent the plaintiff
from continuing to violate the agreement
which he had entered into. The very able
opinion of the learned Judge who presided
in this Court on that occasion, is at once so
concise, yet so thorough and complete,
that reference thereto cannot but convince
even the most incredulous that such is the
clear intent and purpose of the law.
The real point at issue in this case therefore seems to be whether the second consolidation acted within the scope and authority of the law, in refusing to buy goods
from any wholesale dealers who would sell
to the plaintiff, and whether they had
any other remedy than to have the plaintiff in this case enjoined from continuing
his violation of the original agreement,
and, if so, whether the course resorted to
was one of these legitimate remedies.
There can be no question but that any
person can purchase from whomsoever he
pleases and the fact that any one of these
merchants refused to buy merchandise
from a certain wholesale dealer was Lot in
itself an unlawful act. We must therefore
consider whether the combining of so
many merchants would make such an act,
uniform on their part, unlawful.
An eminent authority defines a conspiracy to be "a combination between two or
morepersons for the purpose of accomplishing a criminal or an unlawful object or an
object neither criminal nor unlawful by
criminal or unlawful means." It therefore
devolves upon us to ascertain whether
the object of this association was unlawful
or not and, if not, whether the means employed in its consummation were unlawful.
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We are of the opinion that the first propositiou is clearly answered by Judge Chapman's learned interpretatioa of the law in
Brown v. Matthewson et. als., 12 Cushing
27., wheie he said: "Sometimes associations break down the business of individuals and sometimes an individual is able to
break down the business of associated men.
It would be nothing novel if the plaintiff,
in the exercise of his ingenuity, should in
turn, adopt some improvement to compel
the defendants to dissolvetheir connection.
The cases most nearly analagous to the
one at bar, which we have been able to
find in our own state are: Cote v. Murphy
et als., 159 Pa. 420, and Buchanan v. Kerr.
159 Pa. 433. In. the former of these cases
the court held: "The fact that the dealers,
defendants, told other dealers that they
would vot buy from them if they furnished
materials to the plaintiff, was not such coercion as constituted the action of the combination unlawful," and later the same
court reiterated this opinion in the other
case.
As this is simply an action for tort and
there is no evidence of malice, essential o
conspiracy, and as the evidence sets forth
no illegal intention or action on the
part of the defendants, we feel compelled
to direct a compulsory nonsuit in this case.
DANIEL KLINE, J.

WM. DUTTON vs. WM. HANSOM.
Negligence-Liability of storekeeper'for
injuriesto customers.
STAT=FNT OF THE CASE.
Hansom kept a drygoods store which
Dutton on 3rd of March, 1899, entered for
the purpose of making purchases. While
he was walking along his foot tripped and
he tell heavily, sustaining severe injury.
One who had preceded him at the place 4
minutes, testified that he had noticed that
the carpet was folded over, and that he had
avoided it, and that one not noticing
might easily have placed his foot under
the fold and been thrown down. There
was no other evidence as to the cause of
the fall than plaintiff's who said that his
foot in walking struck something above
the toes, that he fell and became unconscious. The defendant asked the court to

say to the jury that their verdict must be
for the defendant. ,
CoRE and KEELER for plaintiff.
Keeper of place of business must keep his
premises in safe condition. Schmidt v.
Baum, 80 Cal. 566; Carleton v. Iron Co.,
99 Mass. 216.
If he neglects his duty his ignorance of
the defeot is immaterial. Currier v. Boston Co., 135 Mass. 415.
HELRIEGEL and SHomo for defendant.

Plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence. Butler v. R. R., 126 Pa. 160;
Phila. v. Smith, 23 W. N. C. 242; McCully
v. Clark, 40 Pa. 399.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Gentlemen of thejurI:
It appears from the evidence in this case
that plaintiff entered defendant's store for
the purpose of making certain purchases.
While walking along one of the aisles his
foot caught in what subsequently appeared
to be an imperfect fold in the carpet and
he was thrown to the floor, which resulted
in severe injuries.
The only evidence as to the cause of the
fall is the testimony of one witness, who
had preceded plaintiff in the store about 4
minutes. He testified "that be noticed the
carpet was folded over, that he had avoided
it and that one not noticing might easily
have placed his foot under the fold and
been thrown down."
The first question in this case for your
consideration is, was defendant guilty of
any negligence? It is argued that defendant was bound to keep his premises and
the aisles in safe condition and to use ordinary care to avoid accidents or injury to
those entering the store on business and
that defendant has violated his duty in
this respect to plaintiff.
Now what was the duty of the defendant? When he opened his store, he thereby invited the public to come into his
place of business and make purchases in
the usual manner, and when he extended
this invitation he assumed some duty to
the people who should respond to it. (150
Penna. 95, Woodruff v. Painter.)
It cannot be doubted that if the defendant
knowing the carpet to be in an imperfect
condition had permitted it to remain so,
and by reason of it the plaintiff sustained
bodily injury, he would be answerable to
him for the consequences.
The defendant is under an implied con
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tract to all who enter his store to purchase
that no harm or injury that could reasonably be averted should befall them.
Negligence has been held to be "the
want of that care which men of common
sense and prudence ordinarily exercise in
like employment or business." (40 Pa.
402, McCully v. Clark & Thaw) (35.Pa. 60,
Penna. R. R. Co., v. Ogier.)
It is for you, gentlemen of the jury, to
decide whether the conduct and management of the store by defendant conforms
or measures up to the standard of care as
laid down by the above decisions. This
you will ascertain from a careful consideration of all the evidence in this case. If
you come to the conclusion, remembering
what constitutes negligence as previously
stated from eminent authority, that the
defendant was guilty of no negligence on
the occasion of the injury to plaintiff, it
will be your duty to find a verdict for the
defendant.
Negligence is not to be presumed from
the mere fact that plaintiff was injured
while on the premises of defendant. The
remaining question for your consideration
is whether the negligence of the plaintiff
contributed in any degree to his own injury. Was it his duty to ascertain or see
that the aisles were in good condition upon
entering the store or did he act as a reasonable and prudent person would under such
circumstances and in such places.
If you find he acted prudently he cannot
be said to be guilty of contributory negligence. On the other hand if you find that
he contributed in any manner to his injury he cannot recover and your verdict
should be for the defendant.
As has been argued, if the accident resulted partly from the negligence of the
plaintiff, he cannot recover. 157 Pa. 598
Baker v. Gas Co.; 104 Pa. 604, Brown v'
French; 30 Penna. 454, Reeves v. The Del'
L. & W. R. R. Co.; 16 Penna. 493, Beatty
v. Gilmore.
Whether there was negligence or not, on
the part of either or both plaintiff and defendant, is under the facts of this case in
connection with tie principles of law given
you, for your consideration. 169 Pa. 488,
Jos. Glose v. Phila.; 134 Pa. 203, Clopp v.
Nilor; 53 Pa. 436, McGrew v. Stone.
If you are satisfied, gentlemen of the

jury, after due consideration of the testimony, that the defendant was negligent,
which negligence in any manner produced
plaintiff's injuries and that plaintiff himself was not negligent on that occasion,
your verdict should be for plaintiff, otherwise for defendant.
It follows from what has been said that
we cannot instruct you as requested by the
defendant, viz: "That your verdict must be
for the defendant."

C.

SUmNER DAVIS, J.

SAMUEL WILSON vs. JOHN
STEVENSON.
.FraudulentConveyances-Priorityof
Liens-Distribution.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Stevenson, heavily indebted, conveyed
his land to Wm. Sloan, for the nominal
consideration of $4000. The money was
not paid nor wan it intended to be paid,
but Sloan was to hold the property for
Stevenson and reconvey it as soon as the
creditors of the latter were no longer likely
to take it in execution. After the conveyanceWilson recovered ajudgment for$1500,
Charles Hepburn had already recovered
one for $2500. Wilson filed a bill against
Sloan and Stevenson to have the conveyance declared void as to Wilson and the
land subject to his execution. The court
decided in conformity with the bill, after
the decree, and before Wilson issued execution, Hepburn issued an execution and
caused the land to be sold as Stevenson's.
The proceeds were $2000. An auditor was
appointed to distribute the proceeds. He
awarded $1500 to Wilson and the balance
to Hepburn. Hepburn excepts.
HEND.RESON and HESS for plaintiff.

Conveyance which defrauds a person
may be decreed void at his instigation.
Dungan's Appeal, 88 Pa. 416; Hoop's Appeal, 100 Pa. 59.
The property was Sloan's with reference
to the Hepburn claim and could not be
soldas Stevenson's without notice toSloan.
Henderson v. Henderson, 133 Pa. 411.
MITCHELL and FRANK for defendant.

Hepburn's judgment was recovered before the fraudulent conveyance and execution -on it divests lien of Wilson's judgment. Henderson v. Henderson, 133 Pa.
399.
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Conveyance was not fraudulent as to
lUepburn. Rhoads' Appeal, 11 W. N. C.
276.
OPINION OF TRE COURT.

This court is called upon to determine
the rights of two judgment creditors, one
of whom takes exception to the auditor's
distribution.
Wilson obtains a judgment for$1500 after
a conveyance which was clearly meant to
defraud him. He obtained a decree from
the court declaring the conveyance void as
to him and the land subject to his execution. Hepburn, who obtained ajidgment
prior to conveyance, issues execution on
the land and sells it as Stevenson's.
In Hook's Appeal, 100 Pa. 59, Trunkey,
J., "A prior lien creditor may follow the
land irrespective of the changes in the
title, whether honest or dishonest. A judicial saleon his lien vests in the purchaser
the title which the debtor had when the
lien attached and divests that of the debtor's grantee."
Asale uponsubsequentjudgments passes
only the right to contest the grantee's title
for fraud; it passes the quantity of interest
that was fraudulently conveyed and subject to the same liens.
Its purposeand effect is to take away the
title of the fraudulent grantee, whereas
the purpose and effect, of a sale or a prior
lien, is to take the title both of the grantor
and grantee. Byrod's Appeal, 31 Pa. 241.
We cannot see wherein Hepburn has exceeded his rights in issuing execution as
the right vested in him when the judgment was recorded. A sale on his lien divests the land of both liens and the proceeds should have been awarded according
to priority of lien. The fund in court is
the proceeds of the sale of the interest or
title of Stevenson in the name of Win.
Sloan and it must, of course, be distributed
to his lien creditors in the order of their
priority. Henderson v. Henderson, 133
Pa. 399.
Upon sale by Hepburn, after decree of
court, Wilson held, in effect, the same position that he would have held had he obtained his judgment prior to conveyance
and could not participate unless the proceeds exceeded the amount of that lien.
The court therefore sets aside the distri-

bution made by the auditor and awards in
conformity with this opinion.
DANIEL F. DEAL, P. J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

After Hepburn had recovered ajudgment
for $2500 against Stevenson, the latter conveyed his land to Sloan for the nominal
consideration of $4000, the intention of
both parties being that no money should
be paid, and that, after the danger that
the land would be taken in execution had
passed, Sloan should reconvey it to Stevenson. After the conveyance Wilson recovered a judgment for $1500 against Stevenson. Subsequently Hepburn caused a
sheriff's sale of the land for $2000.
The conveyance did not' withdraw the
land from the lien of Hepburn's judgment
nor suspend or otherwise impair his right
to make a sale. That lien was prior in
time and in effect to any lien arising, if
such there was, from theWilson judgment.
It follows that Hepburn should have been
paid the proceeds, unless the facts now to
be adverted to have deprived him of his
right to payment.
Wilson filed a bill againstStevenson and
Sloan and obtained a decree of the court
that the conveyance of the former to the
latter was void and the land still subject
to Wilson's execution. Ordinarily, when
judgment creditors wish to obtain satisfaction from land previously conveyed in
fraud, as they believe, of them, they issue*
an execution. As on this execution the
sale will be a good title, only if the conveyance can be subsequently shown to have
been fraudulent, a full price for the land is
not obtained. *The price represents practically the value of the probability of being
able to show the fraud, which will vary, of
course, according to the value of the land
and the state of the evidence apparently at
disposal. It would be inconvenient therefore to hold that such a sale divests the
estate on which the judgment prior to the
conveyance fastened, for were this so, instead of the full value of the grantor's title
to the land being available for such judgment, it could receive only the. less value
of the more disputable title. It follows
that the anterior judgments are not permitted to take any of the proceeds of a sale
on a posterior judgment.
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In this case, however, by a decree conclusive as to Stevenson and Sloan, it was
determined, in advance of the sale, that
the conveyance was void as to Wilson.
After such a decree we cannot doubt that.
a sale on Wilson's execution would have
been as good a title as a sale on Hepburn's.
The purchaser would have acquired Wilson's right, that is the right to treat the
conveyance to Sloan as actually null; and
not simply to prove it null, if he could, in
some subsequent litigation. It cannot, we
think, be doubted that, as the proceeds
would represent the incontestable title of
Stevenson, the Hepburn judgment would
be divested by it. It would follow that he
would be entitled to be, paid in full before
Wilson. The fact that Wilson incurred
expense and trouble by his bill in equity
could from no point of view affect Hepburn. (1) That litigation was not either
in intention or effect for Hepburn's benefit. Why then should he pay for it? (2)
Hepburn was not a party to it. He could
not prevent it. The decree rendered in it
could not bind him. Its object was not to
affect his relation as judgment creditor to
the land, but Wilson's own relation to it.
(3) Wilson was aware that Hepburn had
the earlier lien, and the right at any time
to issue an execution on it. He should
have known that nothing done by himself to improve his own situation could deprive Hepburn of this right.
It is apparent that Wilson made a tactical blunder, when he filed his bill. Had
he issued an execution, doubtless some one
would have bid something for the chance
of experimenting with the estate of Sloan,
and whatever had been bid, would have
been Wilson's and not Hi.pburn's. By
filing his bill and procuring the decree, he
caused any sale that he might procure on
his execution, to pass a full estate, and
therefore to entitle Hepburn to the proceeds.
But what we have just said is by no
means necessary to the decision of this
case. The execution was not issued by
Wilson but by Hepburn. Thebilland decree could neither deprive him of the
power thus to issue the execution, nor of
the rightto appropriate the proceeds to his
earlier lien. The judgment of the learned
court below must therefore be affirmed.

EZRA FINCH vs. ROBERT THURSTON, E-P AL.

Boycotting-Injuntions.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Finch has recently introduced new maebitiery in the manufacture'of shoes, as a
result of which he is enabled to dispense
with the services of 100 employees.
These men belong to a labor union and
because of their discharge and the use of
the new machinery, all of the union shoemakers in the state have instituted a boycott against the product of the plaintiff's
factory, refusing to buy or wear his shoes,
and refusing to deal with merchants who
handle his shoes.
Finch now asks for an injunction against
Thurston, who is the chief executive offlcer of the uxion, restraining theni from
boycotting his goods and from inducing,
advising or ordering others so to do.
CREARY and Fox for plaintiff.

Injunction will be issued against a boycott. Brace v. Evans, 50. C.163; Hopkins
v. Store Co., 28 C.C.A. 99.
KLINE for the defendant.

Injunction will not be granted where
plaintiff has a statutory'remedy. Hamersley v. Turnpike, 8 Phila. 314.
Thereis no necessity for grantinginjunction, hence remedy should be by 'trial by
jury." Dissenting opinion in 28 C. C. A.
99.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Whether an injunction should be granted in the present case or not can best be
decided by a consideration of the causes
for which the remedy of injunction will
apply; also the rights, privileges and immunities of the different individuals involved. By a close inspection of these elements we can possibly arrive at a safe and
equitable conclusion.
An injunction is wholly a preventive
remedy. If the injury is already done, the
writ can have no operation. It isnotused
for the purpose of punishment, or to cornpel persons to do right, but simply to prevent them from doing wrong. An injunction will not lie where one is pursuing a
right expressly granted to him by thelaw.
The 14th amendment, section 1 provides
expressly that "No state shall deprive any
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person of life, liberty or property without
due process of law." 1iberty consists in
the absence of restraint by someone else,
and due proceis of law, Air. Cooley says,
is used in the same sense as without judgment by his peers or thelaw of theland in
the 29th section of the Magna Charta.
Mr. Finch, in the management of his
affairs, found that by procuring certain
new machinery he could dispense with a
large amount of his help, and he forthwith
procured the machinery and discharged
100 of his hands. ,His right to do this ubbody wishes to dispute. It is one of his
indefeasible rights to run his works upon
as economic a scale as possible.
These men owing their discharge to the
use of this new machinery and being no
longer able to earn a living in that factory,
turned their trade over into other channels
and: also asked their friends that belonged
to the same labor organization to do the
same, which they did. This, then, is
what the plaintiff wishes to restiain the
defendant from doing; upon what grounds
we have so far been unable to discover.
The plaintiff claims that this is an unlawful interference with his business, but we
are of the opinion that it is simply a clash
of interests that every man must contemplate when he enters into the struggle for
wealth and subsistence. As far as we can
understand the law, the fact that the defendants told other dealers that if they
handled the plaintiff's goods they would
cease dealing with them was not such coercion and threats as constituted the acts
of the organization unlawful. A threat is
a declaration of an intention to injure
another by the commission of an unlawful
act. If the act intended to be done is not
unlawful, then the declaration is not a
threat in law, and the effect is not intimidation in a legal sense.
In Hopkins v. Oxley Stove Co., 28 C. 0.
A., the defendant tried to tell the plaintiff
how he had to run his business and actually
went so far as to go to the factory and indicate what machinery he had to dispense
with. Such an interference is malicious
and contrary to all constitutional rights.
The same might be said of Brace Bro. v.
Zvans, 5 C. 0. 163, in which case open violence was resorted to. In both these
cases, upon which the plaintiff relies to

support his action, the mischief was done
by persons.not affected by the change of
affairs and we cannot see that the cases
are at all applicable.
In the case that we are to decide the defendant simply ceased buying from the
plaintiff or any of his constituents and he
also asked his friends to do the same. In
no other way did they molest the plaintiff
or his followers. If the defendant has no
right to do this, the constitutional guarantee of the pursuit of happiness and liberty
without molestation becomes but a hollow
mockery and should be stricken out.
What then does this plaintiff wish to
accomplish by an injunction? The defendants have had their meeting and they
have agreed not to buy from the plaintiff
or anybody that handles his goods; that
act is past and therefore an injunction will
not lie. What other crime then is this
defendant guilty of? Simply that they
buy their footwear wherever they feel disposed. Have they a right to do this ? The
common sense of all humanity answers
yes. The plaintiff also wishes to restrain
the defendant "from advising and ordering others so to do." Is then advising or
ordering others, so long as there is no force
employed, such a heinous crime that chancery will enjoin people from doing so? We
think not. In view of these facts then if
an injunction would be granted, it would
necessarily have to read: That you refrain
from not buying from the plaintiff. That
the court of equity has such a power we
cannot concede. If it can indicate from
whom a person is to buy, then it has indeed become A dangerous vehicle. While
exercising such powers it can sweep away
all competition and demoralize the trade
upon which the nation depends for its
very existence; for these reasons the injunction is refused.
W. B. GERY, J.
OPINIOX OF SUPERIOR COURT.
The bill alleges that the defendants
"have instituted a boycott against the product of the plaintiff's factory, refusing to
buy or wear his shoes, and refusing to deal
with merchants who handle his shoes."
Boycott is not a technical term, and it is
susceptible of a variety of significations.
If we interrogate the bill, as to its meaning, the answer we obtain is, that it con-
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sists in refusal (1) to buy and wear the
plaintiff's shoes, and (2) to deal with merchants who handle hisshoes. Theprayer
of the bill is that the defendants may be
restrained from boycotting, and from inducing, advising or ordering others so to
do.
In so far as the boycott consists in the
defendants' refusal to buy and wear the
plaintiff's shoes, it is manifest that the
court has no right to prohibit it. To prohibit the refusal to buy would be to cornmand thebuying. Shallwe then command
the -purchase of shoes once or twice a year?
of shoes worth $2 or $4 a pair? of shoes for
the defendants' personal use, or also for
the use of their wives and children? Shall
we command the purchase of the plaintiff's shoes when there are the shoes of
other manufacturers which are equally
meritorious and worthy of patronage?
The boycott consists also in the refusal
to deal with merchants who handle the
shoes of the plaintiff. To prohibit this
refusal would be to command dealing with
these merchants. But how? Shall we
require the defendants to buy groceries,
soap, dry goods of such merchants? Shall
we'compel them to buy shoes of them? It
is clear that we can no more insist that
the defendants shall deal with these merchants than that-they shall buy and wear
the plaintiff's shoes.
It is said, however, that the refusal to
buy and wear, etc., is the result of an agreeinent. It is not the spontaneous and several act of the defendants, but the result of
a joint premeditation and decision. Be it
so. We are not asked to prohibit such
combination and concert. They have already taken place. The union shoemakers
"have instituted a boycott." What has
been done cannot be unudone. The fulminations of a chancellor cannot repeal the
past. We cannot abolish the fact that
the shoemakers "have instituted" the
boycott. McDonough v. Bullock, 2 Pears
191.
Can we obliterate from their minds the
memory of this institution? Hardly. Can
we say that they shall not permit their
volitions to be influenced by the memory
of it? How shall we undertake an inquisition into the subtle movements of the
mind, and declare that this or that act of

non-purchase of shoes is the result of the
condemnable conspiracy? We cannot.
If the objective act of non-purchase cannot
be prohibited, neither can it, in so far as it
springs from a recollected concert with
others to refrain from purchasing. None
of the acts averred in the bill as prospective
are susceptible of prohibition, and it is
quite clear that an accomplished and past
act is not.
But, the prayer of the bill is for an injunction against Thurston, the chief executive of the union, restraining him from
boycotting the plaintiff's goods and from
inducing, advising and ordering othefs so
to do. The word boycotting must be interpreted by the preceding portion of the
bill. We have already said that, in the
ense there indicated, it is not susceptible
of injunction. May we restrain Thurston
from "inducing, advising or ordering others" to boycott?
The bill does not aver that Thurston is
about to induceradvise or order others to
boycott. The court does not enjoin against
all possible repreh ensible acts. They must
be commenced, or threatened, and the
averment that they have been is essential
to give the court the jurisdiction. So far
as appears, the union has ordered the boycott, and no other acts remain to be done
save the obedience of its members to the
order. The prayer is not supported by the
necessary averments.
But were the averments present would
they furnish ground for an injunction?
Let us suppose that the bill had charged
that Thurston was about to induce or advise others to avoid buying or using
Finch's shoes. Would this justify the
issue of an inhibitory mandate from the
court? IfA advises or induces B not to
buy C's wares by false representations concerning 0 or his wares, he probably commits an actionable wrong. But does he
if he tells the truth? Suppose that he
fairly criticises the wares, their quality,
their appearance, their price? Suppose he
truthfully alleges matters against C personally, even though those matters should
have no influence upon any man. Is the
act to be enjoined? We think not. It is
not the business of the court to exercise a
paternal oversight over the acts of citizens
and to launch its interdicts against every
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petulant, angry, envious, revengeful, imprudent and injurious word or act.
Let us suppose that the bill averred that
Thurston was ordering and was about to
order others to refuse to buy or wear
Finch's shoes. It is not suggested that
any intimidation is to be employed, or that
any sanctions are annexed to Thurston's
order. To whom is it about to be directed?
To Union men only or to others? Does it
consist of anything more than advice or
inducement? We do not know. is the
only penalty for disobedience, expulsion
from the Union, or the censure and scorn
of its members? We cannot think that
the court is under any duty to prohibit A
notification by Thurston of the resolution
of the Union to its members and exhortations by him to them to steadfastly execute
that resolution, nor can it command the
Union to continue to love and affiliate with
one who ignores his promises to them.
Over their esteem and affection, over their
disapprobation and disgust, the court has
no control, nor has it any over the mere
expressions of these feelings. The bill
suggests no expressions of these feelings
that are from the point of view of the law
reprehensible.
It is to be regretted that in recent times
the courts are so frequently solicited by
capitalists and employers of labor to in terpose their interdictions between them and
their employees. Unable to induce the
legislature to declare and punish as criminal acts of combination and boycott, they
Appeal to the courts to assume a legislative
power to criminalize these acts. The law
refusing to say, if you boycottyou shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor, and punishable
with fine and imprisonment, the courts
are asked to say, you shall not boycott,
and if you do after I have thus forbidden
you, you shall be guilty of a misdemeanor
which I shall term a contempt and punish
with fine and imprisonment at my own
digcretion and without the co-operation
and consent of grand or petit jury. And
this is taking place in communities that
continue to say, "'theright of trial by jury
shall be as heretofore."
Doubtless the
time has come, carefully to revise the
statutes regulative of the relations of labor
to capital, but we are not convinced that
the default of the legislature justifies the
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arrogation by the courts of the jurisdiction
to interfere, with ever increasing frequency,
by interdict with these relations.: It is
important that oppressive combinations of
workmen and of capitalists should be alike
repressed. It is more important, however,
that the punitory power of courts composed of one, two or three judges, acting
without check, should not be unduly extended.
Appeal dismissed.
JOHN MILLER vs. JOSEPH
JENKINS.
Liability of husbandto support wife when
they are living apart,through hisfault.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Matilda Miller, a widow and mother of
the plaintiff, married the defendant, who,
after they had lived together for five Xears,
unjustifiably excluded her from his house
and refused to furnish her any support.
Jenkins owned $20,000 worth of property
and had a business which yielded him an
income of $1400 a year. He had one child
by a former marriage, a son twenty-four
years old, who was self-supporting. Mrs.
Jenkins had as her only support a dower
in her late husband's land of $120 per year.
This was insufficienL to support her. Her
son, John Miller, agreed to take her into
his home and support her if she would pay
him $50 of the dower yearly, stating he
would look after Jenkins for $300 more
per year. He notified Jenkins that he was
supporting his mother, and should demand $300 yearly from him. Jenkins replied that he could pay nothing. This is
assumpsit for the first year's support.
STAUFFER and CIsNEY for plaintiff.
The husband is liable for the wife's
necessaries furnished during a separation,
brought about by his act. Cunningham v.
Irwin, 7 S. & R. 247; Reilly v. Reilly, 4
Brewster 169.
The extent of the husband's liability is
to be determined by the social position of
the parties and the peculiar circumstances
of the case. Breinig v. Meitzler, 23 Pa. 156.
BROCK and MUNDY for defendant.
The question as to what are necessaries,
and as the amount recoverable must be
left to the jury. 23 Pa. 159; 66 Pa.862; 163
Pa. 647; 1 Allen 261; 32 Mich. 2A2.
Where wife has a separate and sufficient
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income the husband cannot be held liable.
Freestone v. Beitcher, 9 Car. & P. 643; 9
Am. & Eng. En. of Law, p. 831.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Gentlemen of the Jury:
This is an action of assumpsit for necessaries furnished the defendant's wife. She
was living apart from her husband. To
recover it is necessary for the plaintiff to
show (1) That they were necessaries. (2)
That they were delivered, and (3) That
the wife had separated from her husband
from good cause. Breinig v. Meitzer, 23
Pa. 156. The defendant admits that he
unjustifiably excluded his wife from his
home.
When a husband has turned his wife out
of doors without any reasonable or just
cause orforces her to withdraw from him
without any means for her support, the
law implies that he has given her credit to
supply herself with such necessaries as are
suitable and proper for her to have; such
as clothing, boarding and lodging. Llewelyn v. Levy, 163 Pa. 647; Hultz v. Gibbs,
66 Pa. 360; Walker v. Simson, 7 Watts &
S. 83; Cromwell v. Benjamin, 41 Barb. 558;
Reynolds v. Sweetser, 15 Gray 78; Daubney
v. Hughes, 60 N. Y. 187; Cunningham v.
Reardon, 98 Mass. 538; Breinig v. Meitzer,
23 Pa. 156; Cunningham v. Irwin, 7 S. &
R. 247; Clark v. Cox, 32 Mich. 212.
The defendant claims that $300, the
amount asked for, is too much for support
ing his wife and that she must first expend
the $120 of her separate income, but I instruct you as matter of law that a husband
must support his wife himself or pay those
who do support .her and of the reasonableness of such c6mpensation you are the
judge. Cunningham v. Irwin, 7 S. & R.
247; Reilly v. Reilly, 4 Brewster 169.
In deciding this question you are to consider the social rank and condition of the
husband; also the amount of property
owned by him and his income, for the
term necessaries is not confined merely to
what is requisite barely to support life, but
includes many of the conveniences of refined society. It is a relative term which
must be applied to the circumstances and
condition of the parties. You may also
consider the fact that there is no one else
dependent upon him, he having but onii
son, who is self supporting.

Therefore, gentlemen, after considering
these facts, you may award theplaintiff the
whole of the amount asked for or any part
thereof that you think reasonable.
PHILIP T. LONERGAN, P. J.
JOHN SHIELDS vs. SAMUEL
MULLIKEN.
Sale bypledgee of articebailed-Noticeof
sale to pledgor.
STATEMIENT OF THE CASE.

Shields borrowed $75 from Mulliken and
deposited with him two bicycles as security. The money was to be paid, Shields
contended, on the 1st of April, 1900, but
Mulliken said on the 1st of January, 1900.
The debt not being. repaid, Mulliken sold
the bicycles, one to X the other to Y, getting $62 for one and $60 for other. He tendered to Shields the difference between
the $75 with interest and the $122, but
Shields refused to receive it and at once,
March 17, brought the action of trespass
for conversion of the bicycles.
Plaintiff's Points. (1) If the debt was
not due till April 1, the sale was unauthorized; the bailment was terminated and
Mulliken was guilty of trespass and must
pay the full value of the bicycles.
Defendant's Points. (3) If the bicycles
brought a full price, as much as they
would have brought by any other sale at
the same time or any later time the plaintiff could not recover or at all events would
not recover more than $47.
WELSH and VASTINE for plaintiff.
Before the pledgee can sell he must give
notice to the pledgor and he must sell at
public auctibn. Sitgreaves v. Bank, 49 Pa.
359; Robertson v. Lippincott, I Phila. 308;
Neiler v. Kelley, 69 Pa: 403; Diller v. Brubaker, 52 Pa. 498; 2 Kent's Comm. 581;
Davis v. Funk, 39 Pa. 243.
If the pledgee makes an unlawful sale
the pledgor may, without tendering the
amount of the debt, sue for damages.
Dykers v. Allen, 7 Hill (N.Y.) 497; Neiler
v. Kelley, 69 Pa. 403; Berry v. Vantries,
12 S. & R. 89; Bryan v. Baldwin, 52 N. Y.
232; Harger v. McMains, 4 W. 418.
The measure of damages is the market
value of the pledged property at the time
of the conversion with interest to time of
trial. Dennis v. Barber, 6 S. & R. 420;
Taylor v. Morgan, 3 W. 333; Simps v. Zane,
1 Phila. 501.
This case cannot properly follow DeLisle
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v. Priestman as a precedent. (1 Browne
176.)
LORD and WALSH for defendant.
When an article is pledged for a definite
time and the time has expired, the pledgee
may sell without notice to the pledgor.
DeLisle v. Priestman, 1 Browne 176.
Plaintiff cannot recover without tenderlig the debt. Bigelow on Torts, p. 240.
Plaintiff cannot recover more than defendant tendered him before suit commenced and plaintiff should pay costs.
Act of March 12, 1867, (P. L. 35); Boyer's
Appeal, 163 Pa. 143; Ins. Co. v. Ry. Co.,
153 Pa. 167.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Gentlemen of the Jury:
This is an action of trespass brought by
John Shields against Samuel Mulliken to
recover the value of two bicycles alleged to
have been converted by said Mulliken.
Shields borrowed $75 from Mulliken and
gave the bicycles as collateral security for
the debt. Shields alleges the debtwas due
.on April 1, and Mulliken denie5 t!iis,
claiming it was due on January 1st. On
January 1, the debt not being paid, Mullrken sold the bicycleswithoutgivingShields
notice. The bicycles were sold for $122 to
different parties. Mulliken then tendered
Shields the difference between what he
sold the bicycles for and fhe amount of the
debt or $47. This amount Shields refused
to accept and brought this action to recover
the value of the bicycles.
Two questions of law present themselves:
1.Had Mulliken a right to sell the bicycles without giving notice of the time
and place of sale, even if the debt were due
on January 1st?
2. What is the measure of damages if
Mulliken had no right to sell ?
First, We think that notice of the time
and place of sale of a pledged article by a
pledgee is necessary. The only dissenting
opinion to this view is found in DeLisle v.
Priestman, 1 Browne 176.
In this case a distinction is drawn between property pledged for a definite
perind and property pledged for'an indefinite period, and holds if property is pledged
for a definite period, notice of the time and
pjace of sale is not necessary. For the following reasons we.have concluded not to
follow this case:
First, because in that case the stock
was pledged for an-indefinite period, and

therefore the opinion of the court does not
apply to the facts in the case at bar.
Secondly, this case has not been followed
in any subsequent decision.
Thirdly, the case was tried in 1815, nearly a hundred years ago.
Fourthly, it is a lower court decision.
The view of the law that we entertain,
i. e., that notice of the time and place of
sale is necessary, whether the property be
pledged for a definite or indefinite period
of time, has been upheld in quite a nqumber
of Pennsylvania cases. In Diller v. Brubaker, 52 Pa. 498,the court says: "The sale
must be public when it is made, and the
notice must specify both time and place.
That this is the law of thisspecies of bailment admits of no doubt." Other cases
substantiating the above proposition are:
Davis v. Funk, 39 Pa. 243; Neiler v. Warren, 69 Pa. 403.
Secondly, assuming from our first proposition, Mulliken had no right to sell, we
are confronted with the second proposition,
viz., what measure of damages should
Shields receive for the conversion ?
From the weight of authority as laid
down in the decisions in Pennsylvania, we
are of the opinion that Shields should recover the value of the bicycles at the time
of sale by Mulliken with interest. The
following cases substantiate this conclusion
of laW: Neiler and Warren v. Keller, 69
Pa. 403; Work v. Bennett, 70 Pa. 484; Pa.
Co. for Ins. etc. v. R. R., 153 Pa. 143; Assigned Est. of Jamison & Co., 163 Pa. 143;
Huntingdon R. R. v. English, 86 Pa. 253.
Therefore, gentlemen of the jury, you
will ascertain the value of the bicycles at
the tine of the sale or conversion and add
to this interest, computing the interest
from the time of sale to time of verdict.
The defendant may however recoup the
debt.
WILLIAM H.

POINTS, J.

JOHN TOLAND vs. JAMES WARREN.
Trespass-Evidence to reduce damages.
STATEMENT OF THE CASH.

Warren, driving negligently on the
street, ran into Toland, -throwing him
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down and inflicting several bruises and
contusions, as well as nervous shock.
On the trial Warren offered
1st To show that Toland was a habitual
drunkard at the time of the accident, and
that but for this his injuries would have
been slight and would have been liberally
compensated for by $20.
Toland's evidence tended to show that his damage
equalled $1,500.
2nd offer was to show that Tolaud since
the accident had been a steady and excessive drinker and that this had aggravated
the consequences of the injuries.
The Court excluded both offers as irrelevant. A point put by defendant was[n ascertaining the loss of earning power
the jury must consider the effect of a settled habit of intemperance on the probability of earning money, and allow for the
reduction only below the.point of earning
power existing at the moment of the accident.
This the court declined.
MILLER and LA31BERT for appellant.
Evidence that plaintiff's time was not
spent in useful occupation is admissible.
Butler v. R. R., 38 Md. 568; Abbot v. Tul
liver, 71 Wis. 64.
Damages can only be compensatory.
Hill v. Clauding, 42 Pa. 493.
SCHANz and LAUER for appellee.
Toland's condition was not contributory
negligence.
Ry. v. Taylor, 104 Pa. 30i;
Ry. v. Kemp, 18 A. & E. R. ft. Cos. 224.
Proximate cause is for judge when factsnot disputed. Twp. v. Wilson, 112 Pa.
574.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
This is an appeal from the decision of
the lower court in which judgment was
rendered for the plaintiff. The facts are
as follows: The appellant was a driver of
an omnibus, and while driving negligently
along the street, ran into John Toland,
throwing him down, and inflicted severe
bruises and contusions, as well as a severe
nervous shock. The plaintiff had been
adjudged an habitual drunkard. The defense was that but for this his injuries
would have amounted to but $20, whereas
the jury rendered a verdict of $1,500. The
second offer was to show that. Toland since
the accident had been a st eady and excessive drinker and that he had aggravated
the consequences of the injury. The court

had also negatived the following point put
by the defendant: In ascertaining the loss
of earning power, the jury must consider
the effect of a settled habitof intemperance
on probability of earning money and allow
for its reduction only below the point of
earning power existing the moment of the
accident.
It seems in this case that facts are not
disputed either as to the negligence or as
to the fact that Toland was an habitual
drunkard. The fact that Toland was an
habitual drunkard was no excuse for Warren acting in a negligent manner. A defendant in an action for damages cannot
excuse himself by saying, as the plaintiff
was negligent so had 1 a right to be. The
fact that Toland had been adjudged an
habitual drunkard was all the more reason
why the plaintiff should have been more
careful rather than negligent. It is a
presumption of law when a stAte of
facts is proven to exist that there is a continued existence of this state till otherwise
proven. There is nothing to negative this
presumption. It is the law in Pa. that in
an action for damages arising from negligence, evidence of the number of the
plaintiff's family, his habits, industry and
economy is inadmissible. P. R. R. Co. v.
Books, 57 Pa. 339.
This being the case, the court was not in
error in refusing to allow the defendant
to show that Toland was an habitual
drunkard. If such evidence were admissible it would be very easy for the defendant
to reduce the damages to a very small
amount. That would be equivalent to saying that the defendant was at fault for being in a poor physical condition, that he
should have been physically perfect, and
he would not have suffered injury.
The second offer was to show that the
plaintiff had.drunk excessively, etc., since
the time of the accident and that had aggravated the injury. It is a principle of
law that the proximate causes of the injury
are to be considered, and that a negligence
which has no operation in causing the injury, but which adds to the damage, is no
bar to the action, though it will detract
from the damages as a whole, and the jury
must in the assessment of damages properly distinguish between the amount of
damages arising from each cause and give
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a verdict for the damages aising from the
defendant's negligence only. Gould v.
McKenna, 86 Pa. 296; Township of W.
MIahony v. Wilson, 112 Pa. 514. It is also
true that where the facts are undisputed,
the question of proximate cause is for the
court. Township of W. Mahony v. Wilson, 112 Pa. 514. Therefore we see no
error in the court in rejecting the offer of
the defendant to show that if Toland had
not been an habitual drunkard, the damages would not have amounted to $20.
Evidence of particular conduct as to
habits and character is only admissible
where a person is a common offender in a
criminal action, as a gambler, cheat, common drunkard, etc.-, but not in civil cases.
Greenleaf on Evidence, Vol. 1, page 50.
Such being the case, as matter of evidence, the court was justified in ruling'out
that evidence which would show he was
an habitual drunkard.
The third point in error was the refusal
of the judge to direct the jury that they
must consider the effect of a settled habit
of intemperance on the probability of earning money and allow for the reduction
only below the point of earning power existing at the moment of the accident. It
would seem in this ease that when a party
had been adjudged an habitual drunkard,
the loss of earning power would be determined absolutely and would not be increased by any excess in the amount of
liquor he might thereafter consume.
It would seem in this case that Toland's
habits after the injury would not in any
way increase his loss of earning power, as
it had been reduced to a minimum at the
time of the accident. In suits by the party
injured himself, the compensation may no
doubt include the damages for pain and
suffering, as well as the expense of medical
attendance and the loss of time consequent
upon confinement under Act of April 26,
1865, and for injuries wantonly inflicted
exemplary damages. P. R. R. Co. v.
Books, 57 Pa. 339.
The courts in their opinions do not seem
to have considered what the after habits of
a man might be, but have rather rejected
them as being too remote and indefinite.
As far as we can determine according to
case law, there was no error in the judge
to refuse the attorney for the defendant in

the last point. The decision of the lower
court is affirmed.
L.

W.

EDWARDS, .1.

CHARLES GLYNN vs. WILLIAM
HALL.
Bight of employer to discharge employec
for misconduct-Habit of gambling,
practicedby a salesman, as a causefor
discharge.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Hall employed Glynn as a salesman for
one year, from January 1, 1899, at a salary
of $800; but on April 13th, discharged him,
the discharge to take effect on May 1st.
He, Glynn, had formed tlie habit, known
to many, of gambling, and though expostulated with, persisted in it. Hall conceiviug that his credit would be hurt if he
retained Glynn, he also feared the effect
of the habit on Glynn's honesty, finding
him incorrigible he dismissed him. He
had been at his work in the store regularly
and was attentive and efficient.
Glynn not having found, though he had
reasonably endeavored, other employment,
on January 12, 1900, brought this assumpsit
for damages.
LONGBoTTot and EBBERT for plaintiff.
Where the term of employment is stipulated the employee cannot properly be discharged except for wanton misconduct.
which materially injures the master's business. Chamberlin v. Morgan, 68 Pa. 168;
Greene v. Washburne, 7 Allen 390; 14 Am.
&Eng. En. of Law, 788.
JoNEs and GRoss for defendant.
The employee's acts were such that he
cannot recover any wages or damages for
his discharge. Libart v. Wood, I W. &
S. 265; Stark v. Parker, 2 Pick 267; Martin
v. Schoenberger, 8 W. & S. 867; Heck v.
Shener, 4 S. & R. 249.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
In this case Glynn, an ex-employee of
the defendant, Hall, is seeking to recover
damages for an alleged wrongful discharge,
at the defendant's hands, before the time
of service (i n this ease a hiring by the year)
lias expired. The defense sought to be
maintained is that Glynn had become an
habitual gambler, and that the danger of
the" labit's influence on his honesty was
so imminent as to lead Hall in self defense
to discharge him.
The fact of Glynn having contracted the
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habit of gambling is not disputed, and the
question in the case appears therefore to the
court to be, simply whether gambling carried on habitually by an employee is a sufficient cause for dismissal. There appear
to be no cases in which this precise form of
dissipation, as a ground of discharge from
service, is ruled on; but numerous cases on
kindred forms of bad habits are to be
found.
Profane language, cursing or obscene
talk has been held to be a sufficient cause,
to justify a master in discharging an employee, even though no allegation was
made that the profane language caused
damage to the master's business. Wilkes
v. Harrison Bros. & Co. 166 Pa. 202. It is
true that in this case plaintiff recovered,
but it waq because the fact of the use of the
language in question was not proven, for
the court distinctly intimates that, if the
cursing, etc., did occur, the discharge by
the masterwasjustifiable. Seealso on this
Warren v. Halsey, Ill. App. 558.
Drunkenness has been frequently held to
be a good cause even if the servant was not
drunk during the time he was actually engaged in work for his master. Ulrich v.
Howes, 156 Pa. 419, the court in that case
saying, "there is no fixed rule in these
cases, and an employer need not wait till
actually damaged before he can discharge."
An older case, Callo v. Bronicker, 4 C. &
P. 518, laid down the rule that any moral
misconduct was sufficient cause though
not directly affecting the employment,
while another case in which the employment was not affected by the misconduct
is Engel v. Shoonmaker, 12 Daly (N. Y.)
417, in which a recovery was denied and
the master justified in dismissing his servant.
Libbart v. Wood is also an authority
somewhat in point, for there the misconduct was larceny by an employee of a common carrier from a passenger, and while
larceny in itself might be claimed to be a
sufficient ground yet in that case it was
claimed that no damage was done the
master and hence the discharge by the
master was wrongful; a recovery was however denied there. Libbard v. Wood, 1 W.
& S. 265.
We feel therefore that the authorities
will sustain us in deciding that habitual

gambling is sufficient cause for discharge
by the master. The fear that Glynn's
honesty would vanish under the continual
temptation his habit would lead him into
was surely not ill-founded, and it can
hardly be said that it was Hall's duty to
watch Glynn's moral downfall until he
was actually robbed before he could dismiss his untrustworthy servant.
Besides, viewing for one moment, the
case from another standpoint. If Glynn
had been aclerk, under bonds,as is required
in some mercantile establishments, and
Hall had retained him, with a full knowledge of his besetting sin, and bad actually
suffered loss, Glynn's sureties, in such a
situation, would be able to set up in defense Hall's negligence in retaining an untrustworthy employee after knowledge of
his bad habits.
As the fact of the gambling habits of
Glynn is not disputed, the court instructs
the jury to find averdict for the defendant.
RALPIH D. NICHOLLS, P. J.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.

Glynn having been employed as salesman for a year was discharged at the end
of the first four months thereof. This action is brought to recover the compensation for the remaining two-thirds of the
year.
The right to recover depends on the sufficiency of the justification for Glynn's discharge. The complaint against him was
that he had formed the habit of gambling,
that this habit was known to many, and
that, though expostulated with, he per-sisted in it. It is conceded that hewas attentive to, and efficient in the discharge of,
his duties in the store.
Improper conduct in the office or duty
of an employee is a just cause of dismissal;
such as embezzlement of property of the
employer, Ulrich v. Hower, 156 Pa. 414;
disobedience of an order respecting the.
work, Matthews v. Park Bros., 146 Pa. 384;
159 Pa. 580; theft of goods in the custody of
the employer as a common carrier, Libbart
v. Wood, 1 W. & S. 265; alteration of entries in the employer's book; the employee
being bookkeeper, Singer v. McCormick,
4 W. & S. 265; abusive and disrespectful
language to the master, Wilke v. Harrison
Bros. & Co., 166 Pa. 202.
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The improper conduct may not directly
concern the employment but may indirectly affect it. The drunkenness of a teamster
while off duty may affect his efficiency
while on duty and justify his discharge.
Ulrich v. Hower, 156 Pa. 414. One of the
qualifications looked for in a salesman is
that he shall not repel but rather attract
custom to the store. The moral character
of the salesman, as known to the community,may be one of the elements which affect
publicsentiment. Thereputation of being
a low, vulgar scoundrel would certainly
deter sensitive and delicate persons from
holding relations with him or with the
store in which they would be likely to encounter him. A wide-spread and a just
suspicion and dislike exist toward habitual
gamblers. Gambling often implies cruelty,
craft and fraud, and is too often found associated with other vile qualities of mind
and habits of action. Prudent and right
thinking persons generally hold relations
but scantily and cautiously with persons
of this class. The custom of the defendant's store may well have been impaired
by the retention as salesman in it of one
who had the reputation in the community
of being a gambler.
Gambling, too, has been often associated
with dishonesty, and prudent men would
scarcely retain in a confidential position
one who was known to be addicted to it.
Up to the time of his discharge Glynn had
been attentive and efficient, noris any imputation of purloining money from the
drawer or articles from the store made
against him. But we do not think that
Hall was required to endure a daily disquietude, or employ a detective to supervise his salesman or bear the risk of an embezzlement at any time. Glynn had been
expostulated with in vain. He preferred
to indulge in his propensity, to allaying
the scruples or anxieties of his employer..
If gambling was already so precious to him
he ought not to complain, we think, when
Hall, to whom it was distasteful, sundered
the connection with him.
Had Hall known of the habits of Glynn
when he employed the latter, he would,
probably, have had no right to discharge
Glynn before the expiration of the year.
He did not know of these habits. He had
reason, and Glynn should have known

that he had reason, to believe that Glynn
had the average morality of those who
apply for the sort of work to which he aspired. We must think that the contract
was made on the condition that Glynn was,
and during the year would continue to be,
free from the vice of gambling.
The only point about which we have
thought that there might be serious dispute is, whether the court ought to have
referred to the jury the question whether
Glynn's gambling would scandalize the
community and alienate custom from the
store, whether it would justly awaken in
Hall's mind fear of the continued honesty
of Glynn, and whether the avoidance of
these effects would be reasonable motive
for the dismissal of Glynn. We have come
to the conclusion that the court could, as
well as the jury, take judicial notice of
these facts. It was not necessary to prove
the effect of a reputation of a salesman for
gambling upon the standing of the store
nor the effect of the habit of gambling on
the honesty of the gambler, and if the jury
might have affirmed these effects, so might
the court. We are also of opinion that it
would have been error to allow the jury to
say that Hall was bound to retain Glynn
and take the risks of diminished patronage
and of a spoiliated money-drawer, and bear
the disquietude which these risks must
engender.
Judgment affirmed.
WILLIAM WAKEFIELD vs. HENRY
VINCENT.
Admissibility in evidence of facts arising
since commencement of suit-Legalityof
associationsformedfor purpose of coercing delinquent debtors.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

As a result of dealings between plaintiff
and defendant, the former owed $275 to
the latter, but, after frequent dunning, refused to pay. Vincent was a member of
an association of business men whose bylaws forbade their dealing with, buying
from or selling to any one who should owe
a debt to any member and, for three
months after it became due, refuse to pay
.it after notice by the creditor member to
the secretary, and the issue by the latter
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of a circular letter to the members, putting 2nd. With respect to the evidence tending
the defaulting debtor on the black list. to establish the illegality of his act. The
Vincent informed the secretary of Wake- policy of our government as indicated by
field's default, and a circular was sent by the decisions of the courts is to permit a
the secretary to all the members. Wake- coalescence of persons having similar obfield subsequently attempted to'buy goods jects and desiring to attain like ends in
from tthree of the members, and they re- order to protect their mutual interests.
fused to sell to him for the reason that he We have the acts referring to Mechanics
and Trades Unions (2 P. & L. 2913) beginhad been blacklisted. (After he brought
suit, dealings were refused by three others ning in 1869 and extending to 1891, legalto whom he sought to sell goods. Evidence izing and continually enlarging the scope
of these facts was offered, and against the of confederation among employees in opobjections of the defendant was admitted.) position to their masters. The Supreme
Wakefield asked the court to say to the Court in the decision of Cate v. Murphy,
159 Pa. 423, have decided that the language
jury that he was entitled to damages for
the probable lessening of his buying and of this act is so elastic as to permit a comselling power for the future arising out of bination of employers against employees.
the prejudice created by the black list and Such acts at common law were indictable
on the ground of conspiracy but by the
by fear which members of the association
would have of incurring the penalties of above acts have been made legal. If the
having dealings with black-listed persons. Supreme Court can so construe this act as
to permit the employers to throw out of
The court gave the instruction. Verdict
work disgruntled employees, thus parafor $1,000. MIotion for new trial.
lyzing industries of a community, in order
CLARK and HOLCOMB for plaintiff.
to increase their profits, it seems to us
A combination by two or more persons
within the spirit of the law to permit merto induce others to cease dealing with a
particular individual is actionable. Lav- chants to protect themselves from designerty V. Varnarsdale, 65 Pa. 507; Crump v. ing p)urchasexs by the means here emComm., 10 Am. St. Rep. 895; Griffith v. ployed.
Ogle, 1 Binn. 172; Haldeman v. Martin, 10
The cases of Burton v. Fulton, 49 Pa. 51
Pa. 370.
and Munhall v. Pa. R. R. Co., 92 Pa.
HARPEL and LIGHTNER for defendant.
150, referred to by counsel, teach us that in
As to the legality of the association,
order to establish conspiracy there must be
counsel for defendant cited: Cote v. Murphy, 1.59 Pa. 420; Buchanan v. Kerr, 159 present the elements of malice or intent to
Pa. 433;Sweeneyv. Torrence, 11 C. C. (Pa.) injure the complainant. This may have
497; Bowen v. Matheson, 14 Allen 499.
been so considered at some distant day,
OPINION OF THE COURT.

A new trial must be granted for the following reasons: 1st. Because of erroneous
admissions of evidence by the court, affectingtheamount of damages. 2nd. Because
there is not sufficient evidence to conclusively establish a conspiracy. While the
counsel failed to present it as any reason
for a new trial, yet it seems to us that evidence with reference to matter occurring
after the beginning of the suit and prior to
its trial is notadmissibleto show the measure of damages. The jury, therefore, under the instruction of the court, have considered too many elements in estimating
the damages.
The second point will be dually considered, 1st. With reference to the association
of which the defendant is a member, and

but principles applicable at that time are
no longer adequate under the conditions
and demands of modern society.
New trial granted.
W. W. JOHNSTON, J.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.

The court below having set aside a verdict for the plaintiff and granted a new
trial, we are to review its conduct of the
second trial, wherein, under instructions
from the court, a verdict was rendered for
the defendant.
The action is, in substance, for defamation of the plaintiff with respect to his
payment of a debt. It seeks damages.
And the damage specially averred is the
loss of ability to buy from and sell to certain persons to whom thedefamatory communication was made. Two sets of facts
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were offered in evidence: three attempts
to buy goods, prior to the action, and three
attempts, pending the action, to sell goods.
These attempts, it is alleged, were rendered
unsuccessful by the information which
Vincent had given of Wakefield's default
to the sellers and buyers. The learned
court admitted proof of the first set of
facts, while excluding proof of the second.
In this exclusion was there error? We
think so.
The cause of action must exist before
the action is begun, but it does not follow
that evidence of no facts which have occurred since its commencement is admissible. Admission, e.g., made pending the
suit, may be shown. If the action is for
libel, slander, negligence, permanent trespass, it is not only allowable to show what
has happened during the action, but what
is likely to happen ever afterwards. Only
one verdict andjudgment can be recovered
and they must, consequently, embrace all
the damages inflicted by the act which is
the gravamen, however remote in time
these damages may be. Weston v. Barnicoat, 175 Mass. 454. In a suit for personal
injury, allowance of compensation is made,
not merely for pain, loss of time, loss of
earnings prior to the verdict, but for those
which are to follow. Much more may
proof be offered of those which have been
suffered down to the time of trial. Wakefield offered to show damage by refusal of
persons to sell to him before he began the
suit and refusal of others to buy from him
afterwards. Both refusals he had to connect as effects with the act of Vincent. It
was as legitimate to prove the later a the
earlier, and the court committed an error
in refusing to hear the evidence.
But it would be useless to reverse the
judgment if, even had the evidence been
received, the judgment must have been
the same. Would a verdict for Wakefield
have been sustainable?
It seems that the members of the association, among whom was Vincent, had
agreed to haveiho dealingswith any debtor
of a member who, for three months, should
refuse to pay his debt. To secure this nonintercourse between them and Wakefield,
Vincent had informed them of his default,
and they had, in consequence, actually
refused to have dealings with him. The

question to be considered, therefore, is,
had Vincent the right to effect non-Intercourse between Wakefield and the members of the association by informing them
of Wakefield's default.
This question, we think, must be answered in the affirmative. The object of
the association was to exert pressure on
debtors to pay their debts by holding in
terrorem over them a loss of business relations with its members. This plainly was
not improper. Every man should pay his
debts. So says the law, so affirms ethics,
so says the sane opinion of the business
world. The act, then, which Wakefield
was constrained to do was an act which
he should have done. The law furnishes
one or two forms of constraint, but it does
not declare that no others are lawful. A
man mayjoin astock-exchange and expose
himself to expulsion if he does not pay his
debts. Knight v. Ihs. Co., 14 Phila. 187.
He may be a communicant of a church
which will exclude him, on information
furnished to it by his creditor, of his refusal to pay the debt. We have never
heard that it is a civil wrong for the church
to refuse social intercourse with a member
for this reason, or for a creditor to furnish
information to the church of the delinquency. The law is sometimes jealous of
competition, but its jealousy has not induced it to prohibit this form of coercion,
a resort to which, nevertheless, might be
imagined to imply a disparagement of its
own methods. In these cages it is true
that the debtor has, in a sense, agreed "o
the use of the means. Wakefield did not,
by joining the association or otherwise,
voluntarily submit to it. Wecanot think
that this is material. Vincent could have
refrained, himself, from having further
dealings with Wakefield. He could have
told the fact of the default to whom he
pleased, for it was a fast, and the law does
not punish the publication of a fact. Nor
would he have been prohibited from publishing it although he knew that the result
would be to deter some from- buying from
or selling to Wakefield. The agreement
of the association simply increased the degree of this probability. The promise in
advance not to deal made non-intercourse
more .nearly certain than it would otherwise have been. We fail to see that Vin-
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cent has done any act which exposes him
had in fact no money in the bank, but he
to a just objurgation.
was a director of the bank and two brothers
The right of Vincent and the members and his father with two other persons were
of the association severally to refuse com- co-directors.
mercial relations with a debtor could, we
His brother and father were aware of the
suppose, be questioned by no one. It is transaction, in fact directing the cashier to
true that the principle is by no means uni- issue the certificate. Mapes instead of obversal that what each of ten or twenty may taining credit with the vendor of agriculdo without concert, they may agree to do. tural implements .in which he dealt, apOn the other hand, to say that all confed- plied to Wilson for a loan of money, stateracies to do simultaneously any act which ing that he wanted in all $12,000 and askmay result in disagreeable consequences to
ing for a loan of $2,000.
another are tortious would be fatuous.
Wilson, shown the certificate, and influThat many men refrain from buying from enced by it, lent the $2,000. He subseor selling to Wakefield because he did not quently learned that Mapes had no money
pay a just debtmay beirksometo him. It
in the bank and was entirely insolvent.
is not wrong. Nor are we willing to con- Hence the action of trespass for the bank's
cede that it is wrong when they so refrain deceit.
in concert with each other. It is irksome
GErY and LORD for plaintiff.
to creditors to be deprived of their money,
The act of issuing a certificate of deposit
and to be compelled to resort, at great ex- is within the scope of the cashier's authorpense and inconvenience, to the tedious ity. Bank v. Mangan. £8 Pa. 452; Armand uncertain processes of the court, and strong v. Bank, 133 U. S. 433; Baker v.
Hazard, 6 W. & S. 227.
they are not only not to be blamed, but
An action lies for a false representation
they are to be commended for attempting asto the credit of aperson. Erie City Iron
to devise a cheaper and surer means if they Works v. Broker, 106 Pa. 125.
BROOKS and HARDESTY for defendant.
call.
The action of bank officers is binding
What we mean to affirm -is that no man
has a right, having failed to pay his debt, upon the bank, only when they are acting
according to the ordinary customs of bankto the abstinence of his creditor from a ing in the community.
Warner's Appeal,
publication of this fact to others, with a 147 Pa. 140; Spering's Appeal, 71 Pa. 11;
view to their desisting from business inter- Lloyd v. West Branch Bank, 15 Pa. 172.
Plaintiff must show that the certificate
course with him, although this desistance
was the paramount authority which inis made reasonably sure to follow upon the fluenced him in
extending credit. Cox v.
publication, by an agreement in advance. Highly, 100"Pa. 249; McAlier v. McMurray,
Neither the publication nor the ensuing 58 Pa. 126.
expected and intended non-intercourse
OPINION OF THE COURT.
affords a ground for the recovery of damThis action was brought by John Wilson
ages.
against the Agricultural Bank to recover
Judgment affirmed.
the sum of $2,000 that Wilson had loaned
Mapes on the strength of a certificate of
JOHN WILSON vs. AGRICULTURAL deposit he held for $10,000 in the defendBANK.
ant bank which the cashier had given
him at his solicitation and under the diLiability of corporations for torts-esponsibility of bank for deceit wrought by rection of.Mapes' father and brother who
false certificate of deposit issued by with himself, another brother and two
others were the directors of the Bank. The
cashier.
object of this certificate was to enable
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Mapes to obtain credit with an implement
The bank being incorporated as one of house.
deposit and discount, its cashier at the so- I He showed the certificate to Wilson,
licitation of Henry Mapes gave to him a stating that he wanted to borrow in all
certificate of deposit of $10,000.
The ob- $12,000, asking him for aloan of $2,000. He
ject of this was to enable Mapes to show subsequently learned that Mapes had no
the certificate and obtain credit. Mapes money in the bank and was entirely
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insolvent. Hence this action against the
Bank.
The counsel for the defendant claim that
this action cannot be maintained against
the Bank, conceding that the action is
rightly brought. The case presents to us
the following:
Did the cashier act within the scope of
his authority when he gave to Mapes, at
the solicitation of himself and two other
directors of the Bank, the certificate of deposit for $10,000? The cashier of the Bank
is the mere agent of the directors and the
fact that he acts at the solicitation of one
or more of them does not bind the Bank.
Acts to be binding must be authorized in
the regular course of business or at the request of a majority of the directors; Chiqf
Justice Marshall in Winthrop v. The Bank
of U. S., says, "the power of the agent is
limited by the authority given him, and
if he transcends that authority the act cannot affect his principal; he acts no longer
as agent.
In the case at bar we have no evidence
to show that the cashier was duly authorized to issue such certificates, or that the
issuing of such a certificate is within the
regular course of business, but that it is
rather unusual to give a certificate when
there is no money iriibank. A comparison
of this case with that of Dorsey v. Alosis,
85 P. S. R. 299, in which a certified check
was given we can see no distinction. The
mere fact that a man has a deposit one day
of $10,000, oi even a certificate of such deposit, we must not infer that he shall con.
tinue to have that amount on deposit.
What would have been the rights of this
plaintiff had Mapes at the time the loan
was made the amount of the certificate on
deposit in the defendant Bank, and before
the loan was due had drawn it all out?
Would the Agricultural Bank have been
liable? We think not. The plaintiff was
guilty of laches by not requiring him to
furnish security for the loan, or insisting
that the certificate of deposit be endorsed
to him as collateral.
Judgment for the defendant.

of trespass. At the threshold of the case,
then, lies the question, may a corporation
be liable for such a tort? A corporation
can do nothing except through natural
persons. It cannot think, intend, be benevolent or malevolent, be careless or careful. If a contract is made by it some natural person frames the offer, expresses it
in words, negotiates, receives the acceptance of the offer. If the corporation is a
bank, some natural person determines to
discount a note for X, receives the note
from and pays the money to X. If the
corporation is a railroad, some natural person sells the ticket and receives the fare,
kindles the fire, puts water in the boiler,
arranges the schedule of trains, etc. The
theory of the corporation is the theory of
the imputation to a group of persons related
in a certain mode, of the acts of particular
naturalpersons. When acontractismade
by A for the corporation, the intention is
in A, the words are A's, but the courts
treat the corporation as if it had formed
this intention and uttered these words.
There is no greater difficulty in the imputation of a bad state of mind than of a good;
of deceit than of honesty, of negligence
than of care, of malice than of benevolence.
A very little reflection will discover that
it is as easy to attribute a tort to a corporation as a contract, and accordingly, the
capacity of a corporation to commit and to
be liable for a tort, is amply recognized.
Taylor Corp. 303. And it may commit deceit, Erie City Iron Works v. Barber, 106
Pa. 12.5; Clark Corp. 195; Taylor Corp. 311.

Two questions demand solution. (1) Was
a deceit practiced on Wilson by the cashier
of the Agricultural Bank? (2) Is this deceit to be regarded as that of the bank?
(I) The certificate of deposit was untrue.
N ) money was in fact on deposit. It was
known by the cashier to be untrue. It
was shown to and believed by Wilson. It
influenced him. We cannot adopt the
principle contended for by the learned
counsel for the defense, that no deceit, in
the technical sense, is perpetrated, unless
the deceptive statement is the sole or prePIPER, J.
ponderant motive to the act of the complaining party. It is enough that he would
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.
The plaintiff, alleging that a deceit has not have acted as he did, but for the statebeen practiced upon him by the cashier of ment. Other considerations may be indisthe defendant, sues the latter in an action pensable, but if alone they would not have
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moved the will of the plaintiff, the statement is to be deemed a true cause of his decision.
But it is urged that the statement must
have been intended to deceive the plaintiff
and that it was not intended to deceive
him. The evidence justifies the inference
that it was intended to be shown to others
in order that Mapes might obtain credit.
If A gives a false certificate of solvency or
of ownership of property to B with the intention that B may, find some one who
will lend him money in consequence of it,
A practices a fraud on any from whom B,
by means of it, may subsequently obtain
the money. Clark Cont. 342.
Even had the cashier intended that the
certificate should be shown to the vendor
of agricultural implements -only, in order
to induce him to sell on credit to Mapes,
we think he would be guilty of a deceit towards any one on whom Mapes, by means
of it, imposed. It was fitted to deceive
anybody, and the cashier must be charged
with knowledge of this fact. When he
put the certificate in Mapes' hand with a
fraudulent intent, though it was directed
to X, he must be held responsible for
Mapes' use of it to deceive Wilson. Cf.
Hindman v. 1st National Bank of Louisville, 48 L. R. A. 210; 2 Thompson Corp.
1472; Elliott Corp. 49.
2. The second question is, is the deceit
perpetrated by the cashier to be imputed
to the bank? The power of the cashier
virtute officii, to issue a certificate of deposit
or certified check, is indisputable. Morse,
Banking 202; Zane, Banks and Banking
152; Merchants' Bank v. State Bank, 10
Wall 604; Dorsey v. Abrams, 85 Pa. 299.
Normally, he should issue the certificate or
certify the check, only when there is a deposit actually in the bank, corresponding
with the certificate or check. As, however, only the cashier can, usually, know
whether the money is in the bank, those
who rely on the certificate have a right to
accept as true the averment, implied in the

issue of the certificate, that the money is
in the bank. Morse, Banking, 208. A
bonafide purchaser for value of the certificate, though it be false, can compel the
bank to redeem it. Armstrong v. American Exchange National Bank, 133 U. S.
433; Barnes v. Ontario Bank, 19 N. Y. 152.
Dorsey v. Abrams, 85 Pa. 299, tacitly concedes this principle, but excepts the certificate then before the court from its operation, on the ground that the certificate on
its face contained a warning that it had
not been issued in due course of business.
Had Wilson bought the certificate bona
fide we cannot doubt that he could have
compelled the defendant to redeem it.
But Wilson did not buy it. He made no
contract respecting it. It was used to seduce him into making a contract to lend
money to Mapes. "It is the usual practice," say the Circuit Court of Appeals of
the United States, "for depositors and customers of a bank to refer others to the bank
for information as to their financial responsibility. To give such information to
third persons or to the public at the instance of the customer or depositor is certainly not beyond the scope of banking
powers." Hiudman v. 1st National Bank
of Louisville, 48 L. R. A. 210. At the instance then of Mapes, the 'cashier makes,
in substance, a written statement that he
has $10,000 in bank, in order that he may
show it to any with whom he might deal,
instead of compelling such person to betake himself to the bank and make inquiry
there. Had the cashier, applied to by
Wilson, made the oral statement that
Mapes had $10,000 in the bank, we think
his act would be imputable to the bank, as
whose officer only he could have and give
theinformatibn which he was undertaking
to impart. Therefore the issue of a written
statement by him, in the form of a certificate, must likewise be regarded as the act
of the bank.
Judgment reversed, and v. f. d. n.
awarded.

